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EMBEZZLED MONEY THROUGH A WAGER DOES NOT ACQUIRE TITLE
TO SAME AS AGAINST TRUE OWNER.-A bank teller embezzled money

from the bank and used the money to make wagers with the defendant, a bookmaker. The defendant would appear at the teller's window, whereupon he would be handed an envelope containing the
money and a list of horse racing selections. In the inception the bets
were never more than twenty dollars. Later, however, the wagers
increased as high as one thousand dollars daily. These larger sums
were embezzled moneys. The assignee of the bank sued to recover
the funds of the depositary which had been transferred to the bookmaker. Held, restoration ordered. One who takes embezzled money
by virtue of wagers does not acquire good title to it as against the
one from whom the money was stolen, even though he had no knowledge of the embezzlement. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.
v. Benevento, - N. J. L. -, 44 A. (2d) 97 (1945).
The defendant contended that he had no knowledge of the embezzlement and that when money obtained through the perpetration
of a felony is transferred to an "honest taker", the latter acquires
good title to the same as against the lawful owner, if the "honest
taker" has no knowledge of the embezzlement. But a party cannot
be willfully blind to the import of facts sufficient to put an ordinary
prudent man upon inquiry. Such a willful blindness is fraudulent
and is not sustainable in equity and good conscience.' The nature
of the action for money had and received is an equitable action in
spirit although legal in form.2 Conceding the fact that the defendant
lacked knowledge he would nevertheless be devoid of title to the
money. It is elementary that at the common law one who steals
property cannot pass good title to that property. And since gambling
is unlawful by statute 3 the transfer of title is not effected by the
mere delivery of money upon a wager.4 The transferee holds the
money without any other right or duty respecting it than to return
it on demand to the lawful owner, enforceable by an action of
indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received. 5
The defendant then contended that the right given by statute 8
to the loser to regain his lost moneys was a personal right limited
by a statutory time limit and was not assignable. But the court held

1 United

States Steel Corp. v. Hodge, 64 N. J. Eq. 807, 54 At. 1 (1903).
2 United States v. Jefferson Electric Manufacturing Co., 291 U. S. 386,
78 L. ed. 859 (1934).
3 N. J. R. S. § 2:57-1: "All wagers, bets or stakes made to depend upon
any race or game... shall be unlawful"; cf. N. Y. PINAL CODE § 994.
4 Van Pelt v. Schauble, 68 N. J. L. 638, 54 At. 437 (1903).
5 Ibid. Huncke v. Francis, 27 N. J. L. 55 (1858).
6N. J. R. S. § 2:57-5: "If any person shall lose any money... and
shall pay or deliver the same ...

to the winner ...

such person may sue

for and recover such money . . . ; but such suit shall be brought within six
calendar months after payment or delivery as aforesaid"; cf. N. Y. PENrAL
CODE § 995.

1945]

RECENT DECISIONS

that the right of action arose out of implied contract on the part of
the depositary to return the money to the lawful owner, and all choses
in action arising out of contract are assignable. The statute did
not change the manner in which the right arose, it simply gave the
loser whose right of action previously was unenforceable because he
was in pari delicto with the winner, an opportunity to repent and
recover his losses.7 The assignee, however, is not in pari delicto
with the winner and therefore the statutory limitation as to recovery
of gaming losses by the loser is inapplicable.

I. K.

7 Van Pelt v. Schauble, 68 N. J. L. 638, 54 AtI. 437, cited supra note 4.

